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1. Introduction 
 
Present across official, popular, and critical academic imaginations, a consensus prevails in 
understandings of the governance of the contemporary global financial crisis. While debates 
rage over the causes and consequences of the crisis that began in the summer of 2007, the 
means and ends of the initiatives which sought to manage the crisis have been consistently 
explained in essentially the same terms. The governance of the global financial crisis appears 
to be a set of emergency and historically unprecedented actions undertaken by sovereign state 
institutions, especially the central banks, treasuries, and regulatory institutions in the United 
States of America (US) and United Kingdom (UK). The purpose of these interventions would 
also seem apparent: to rescue the markets, the banks, and finance capital. In short, the 
consensus holds that the governance of the contemporary global financial crisis was a matter 
of the state saving capitalist markets from themselves, and of the public socialization of 
private losses.         
 
This book provides an alternative account of the how the global financial crisis was governed 
from 2007 through to 2011. It shares with the prevailing perception a focus upon the 
management of the crisis in the US and the UK: not only was the crisis ‘made in America’, 
but the global dominance of the US dollar and the global reach of Wall Street and the City of 
London is such that, in effect and in the first instance, Anglo-American crisis governance was 
global crisis governance. The book’s remit thus does not extend to the ways in which the 
crisis was governed as the eye of the storm travelled latterly to the Euro currency area. It also 
does not look elsewhere -- to interstate groupings (e.g. Group of 20, G-20), international 
organizations (e.g. Bank for International Settlements, BIS), and private transnational 
associations (e.g. Group of 30, G-30) -- in order to explore the principal mechanisms through 
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which the crisis was managed (Germain 2010; Helleiner, Pagliari, and Zimmermann 2010; 
McKeen-Edwards and Porter 2013; Porter 2014). Rather, the book offers an analysis that will 
make Anglo-American global crisis management intelligible in a different way. It will show 
that the consensus, which casts sovereign state institutions as salvaging markets, serves to 
conceal a great deal more than it reveals about how the global financial crisis was governed. 
And, although one of the results of crisis management has indeed been that its costs are now 
being unequally and unevenly socialized on both sides of the Atlantic, the book will show 
that to understand crisis governance in these terms is to confuse its consequences with the 
contingent processes and practices through which it was enacted.       
    
The book’s challenge to the consensus over the governance of the crisis of global finance is 
also a challenge to the deeply engrained frameworks of thought upon which that consensus is 
founded. Economics and political economy feature fundamental disagreements over whether 
stabilizing actions in times of crisis can and should be avoided, or whether they are indeed 
inherent to capitalist finance. Yet, these otherwise sharply contending fields contain 
significant shared assumptions about financial crisis management that, whether explicitly 
acknowledged or not, lead to startlingly similar accounts of the governance of the 
contemporary crisis. As Chapter 2 will outline, for both economics and political economy, it 
is the sovereign institutions of the state which are the agents that engineer crisis management, 
and the perennial aim in moments of rupture is to restore the circulations of the markets, 
banking, and finance capital. As will be encountered across Chapters 3 to 8, moreover, this 
consensus tends to frame explanations of the specific interventions that were made in an 
attempt to control the contemporary crisis, from the so-called ‘liquidity injections’ of central 
banks as monetary sovereigns, to the austerity programmes of treasuries as fiscal sovereigns.        
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The book’s analysis of the governance of the global financial crisis is grounded not in 
economics and political economy, then, but in the field of cultural economy. Cultural 
economy is an interdisciplinary academic venture which primarily covers sociology, human 
geography, anthropology, and business and organizational studies (Amin and Thrift 2004; 
Bennett, McFall and Pryke 2008; du Gay and Pryke 2002). Gaining momentum over the last 
decade or so, it is the outcome of diverse responses to the implications of the ‘cultural turn’ in 
social theory for understandings of economy. It features, but is certainly not limited to, an 
interest in the efficacy of the theories and methods of science and technology studies (STS) 
for the study of economy (e.g. Callon 1998; Pinch and Swedberg 2008; Woolgar, Coopmans, 
and Neyland 2009). Cultural economy has also achieved particular traction through research 
into financial markets that, reflecting the strong imprint of STS, is often labelled as ‘the 
social studies of finance’ (SSF) (Kalthoff 2005; Knorr Cetina and Preda 2005, 2012; 
MacKenzie 2009). Cultural economy and SSF do not provide, however, a ready-made and 
established set of conceptual tools for thinking anew about the governance of the global 
financial crisis. The book’s analytical motivations are thus intertwined with a further purpose: 
to develop the conceptual means by which the management of financial crises can be 
understood in the terms of SSF and cultural economy.    
 
The severe turbulence of the contemporary crisis caught the social studies of finance 
somewhat off-guard. SSF consolidated during a period of financialized economic growth. 
Intensifying across three decades or so, and propelled by compounding asset bubbles which 
centred on stock markets and latterly on real-estate and debt markets, these processes came to 
an abrupt halt in the crisis. While finance was booming, there was little to question the 
preoccupation of SSF with the socio-technical processes through which markets are made, 
and with what Ҫalişkan and Callon (2009, 2010) define as the research agenda of 
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‘economization’ and ‘marketization’. Government programmes and regulatory authorities did 
occasionally feature in SSF accounts of these processes in new markets, but tended to remain 
an unopened ‘black box’ while the seemingly self-regulating financial markets being studied 
were forging ahead (MacKenzie 2005). Explanations of regulatory change, and the politics 
therein, were largely left to political economists, although not all in that field were satisfied 
with such a division of labour (e.g. Konings 2010). As a consequence, and despite being in a 
position to provide insightful and distinctive accounts of the unravelling of markets once the 
crisis hit (e.g. Langley 2008a; MacKenzie 2011; Poon 2009), SSF developed something of an 
analytical blind-spot to the kinds of governance interventions which held finance together as 
boom turned to bust.  
 
The actions of crisis management can be conceived of, however, in the terms favoured by the 
social studies of finance. There was, for example, no blueprint for controlling the crisis; 
governance was typically tentative and incremental, and often featured the kind of in vivo 
experiments that are also present in processes of marketization (Beuneza, Hardie, and 
MacKenzie 2006; Muniesa and Callon 2007). Crisis management also brought together 
fragments of old and new ideas, techniques from the past, and long forgotten and freshly 
minted institutional and legislative provisions; in other words, like marketized actions, 
governance actions had to be assembled (Hardie and MacKenzie 2007), and were put 
together in a process akin to the bricolage of financial market innovation (Engelen et al. 
2011). Attempts to control the crisis were also marked by the materiality and power of 
‘market devices’ (Muniesa, Millo, and Callon, 2007) - such as, for instance, bank balance 
sheets - that actively calculated and literally figured the crisis; again, similar to marketization 
processes, governance was thoroughly socio-technical (MacKenzie 2009; Preda 2009). 
Therefore, it is by broadening the vision of the social studies of finance, and by reaching out 
5 
 
to what Michael Pryke and Paul du Gay (2007) call a ‘cultural economy of finance’ to enable 
this task, that the book develops an alternative account of the management of the global 
financial crisis.  
 
As it targets the consensus view on crisis governance, the book’s analytical and conceptual 
motivations also fold into a political purpose. For the philosopher Jacques Rancière (2010), 
‘the essence of consensus … does not consist in peaceful discussion and reasonable 
disagreement, as opposed to conflict and violence’ (p. 42). Instead, as he continues, at the 
core of consensus is ‘the distribution of the sensible’ and ‘the annulment of dissensus’; that 
is, limits are placed on what is thinkable, sayable, and doable by dominant perceptions which 
serve to close down political space for dissent. Thus, the consensus on crisis governance 
certainly did not prevent debate in the course of the crisis, and neither does it prevent ongoing 
deliberations. As will be shown throughout Chapters 3 to 8, how best to govern the problems 
of the crisis was the subject of considerable uncertainty and dispute amongst economists, 
media analysts, bureaucrats, and politicians. And, at the time of writing at the end of 2013, 
the consensus continues to create scope for disagreement: on either side of the Atlantic, 
politics now centres on how the state can best be configured in response to a vast array of 
post-crisis problems, whether monetary, fiscal, or regulatory. Consider, for example, present 
debates over curtailing the so-called ‘quantitative easing’ (QE) of ‘unconventional’ monetary 
policy, the effectiveness and consequences of fiscal austerity, and achieving the right balance 
between regulatory capital requirements and the supply of credit in banking.  
 
Nonetheless, by separating out hierarchical domains of practice and functions in such a way 
that crisis governance is taken to be, by definition, the sovereign institutions of the state 
acting upon malfunctioning markets, the consensus produced (and continues to produce) a 
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closure of the space for political dissent. What this boiled down to was ‘the assertion that 
there is a specific place for politics’ that ‘can be nothing but the place of the state’ (Rancière 
2010: 43). ‘Conflicts’ over how the crisis should be governed were reduced to technical and 
liberal pluralist questions over the ‘problems to be resolved by learned expertise and the 
negotiated adjustment of interests’ (p. 71). Revealing, in this respect, is the bewilderment and 
frustration that was typically provoked by the most significant expression of dissent that 
emerged to contest Anglo-American global crisis governance: the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) 
movement.  
 
Media coverage struggled to explain the OWS encampment at Zuccotti Park from mid-
September to mid-November 2011, largely because it did not articulate a clear set of demands 
and interests that could be translated into specific policy actions, or reconciled through the 
political processes of the state (see Catapano 2011). Some academic supporters of the claims 
that OWS made on behalf of ‘the people’ and ‘the ninety-nine percent’ also cast doubt on the 
efficacy of the movement because it spurned leadership hierarchies and a strategic agenda for 
future action (e.g. Žižek 2011). However, in the terms of Rancière (2011: 13), ‘the framing of 
a future happens in the wake of political invention rather than being its condition of 
possibility’. Emancipatory politics is a matter of opening up new possibilities and the 
prospects for the creation of political subjectivities, and not the designing of a new order to 
come. Indeed, as a range of academic analyses suggest, what was radical and significant 
about OWS was precisely that it interrupted and disturbed the precepts and practices of crisis 
governance (e.g. Douzinas 2013; Harcourt 2013). As a contribution to this dissensus, the 
book is clearly modest. Yet, when offering a creative, analytical, and conceptual contribution 
that unsettles how the governance of the global financial crisis might be understood, the book 
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also seeks to be an inventive, political contribution towards the redistribution of the sensible 
in the post-crisis organization of global finance.   
 
By way of an overview of what follows, Chapter 2 begins by elaborating upon the 
methodological and conceptual tools that are employed throughout. Underpinning the book’s 
research and analysis is Michel Foucault’s (2003a) method of problems and problematization. 
Emerging in his later work, this is a method that extends the archaeological and genealogical 
approaches that Foucault (1972) previously developed, after Nietzsche, in order to interrogate 
power-knowledge relations and discursive formations. It is a method that explicitly directs 
inquiry to consider the ways in which problem-objects are abstracted, such that they can be 
acted on through apparent solutions. Putting the method to work here, crisis governance is not 
explored as a set of institutional interventions taken in the face of materially evident crisis 
circumstances. Rather, researching how the crisis was rendered governable requires careful 
attention to the contingent manner in which it was made-up and managed, as a number of 
relatively discrete technical problems that each required their own dedicated response and 
which delimited and depoliticized crisis governance.  
 
Chapter 2 also begins to develop the conceptual anchor point for the book’s analysis of 
financial crisis governance; that is, the concern with agency and action which intersects a 
variety of approaches to cultural economy (McFall 2008; Pryke and du Gay 2007). For 
cultural economists, what is typically thought of as ‘agency’, ‘as the capacity to act and to 
give meaning to action’ (Callon 2005: 4), is not centred upon and possessed by institutions 
and persons, such as firms, managers, banks, financial market traders, and consumers. 
Instead, cultural economy research employs a variety of categories that are broadly united in 
conceiving of agency as decentred and distributed, relational and compounded. Agency is 
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thus a processual hybrid that requires connections between ‘human beings (bodies) as well as 
material, technical and textual devices’, all of which are ‘mobilized’ and ‘take part in the 
action’ (Ҫalişkan and Callon 2010: 9). As extant research in the social studies of finance 
attests, cultural economy conceptions of agency have significant implications for the analysis 
of marketized actions. As the book will show, these implications extend to understanding 
crisis governance actions which apparently centre on the agency of sovereign state officials 
and institutions.        
 
Across Chapters 3 to 8, the book is structured to make visible an overarching argument: the 
global financial crisis was not governed as a given development, as a crisis of markets, 
banking, or finance capital. Rather, the crisis was abstracted as a range of provisionally 
figured and relatively discrete problems; namely, and primarily, as technical problems of 
liquidity, toxicity, solvency, risk, regulation, and debt. As Table I summarizes, the book’s 
main chapters will analyse how, from summer 2007, the crisis of global finance was turned 
into six specific problems, each with dedicated solutions to be ostensibly enacted by the state. 
Chapter 3 begins at the beginning, so to speak, by analysing how the crisis was rendered and 
governed as a seizure of liquidity in money and capital markets. Financial crises are typically 
understood -- by definition, and by economists of various hues -- as liquidity crises. That the 
crisis could not be controlled as a liquidity problem, even when it was acted on in ways that 
broke the mould of the established last resort lending practices of central banks, was thus 
especially telling as to its depth and magnitude. The loss of liquidity was not merely an 
abrupt halt in the circulations of global finance that authorities sought to repair. It was also a 
moment when that which made those circulations possible -- narratives, confidences, 
calculations, business models, monetary policies, regulatory policies, and so on -- also 
unravelled and ruptured.  
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Although Chapters 4 to 8 address the ensuing struggle to forge and manage the crisis in other 
ways and once liquidity had been lost, this series is only chronological in broad terms. It is 
certainly not the intention of the book, as is the case in some official and academic accounts 
(e.g. BIS 2008, 2009, 2010; Thompson 2012), to present the crisis as a number of identifiable 
phases to which authorities marshalled their corresponding responses. The diagnosis and 
treatment of the crisis as problems of liquidity and toxic assets did indeed largely precede the 
puzzle of bank solvency, for instance, and the crisis has settled-out most recently as a 
problem of sovereign debt which apparently requires fiscal austerity measures by way of 
obligatory solution. However, and alongside the problems of liquidity, toxicity, and solvency, 
the attempts to govern the crisis as problems of both risk and regulation that eventually 
gained traction during 2009 had been largely ongoing from the end of 2007.  
 
Table 1: The Problems and Solutions of Crisis Governance 
 
 Problem 
 
Solution Principal Actions 
 Liquidity 
(money and 
capital markets)   
Liquidity from central 
banks 
(‘liquidity injections’ 
and ‘liquidity 
facilities’) 
   
Open market operations (OMOs) and discount 
window lending; programmatic interventions 
in money and capital markets; and quantitative 
easing (QE) (Federal Reserve and Bank of 
England, from 08/07)   
 Toxicity 
(sub-prime 
Temporarily remove 
toxic assets from 
Maiden Lane LLC I, II, III (Federal Reserve, 
03/08 and 11/08); and Troubled Assets Relief 
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assets)  
 
circulation  
(‘bad banks’) 
 
Program (TARP) (US Treasury, 10/08) 
 
 Solvency 
(banking) 
Recapitalization of 
banks  
(‘bank bailouts’) 
 
Bank Recapitalization Fund and allied actions 
(HM Treasury and Bank of England, 10/08); 
Capital Purchase Program and allied actions 
(US Treasury and Federal Reserve, 10/08); and 
ad-hoc bailouts of individual institutions in 
both US and UK.   
  
 Risk 
(probabilistic 
risk 
management) 
 
Anticipatory 
techniques  
(‘stress testing’)  
Supervisory Capital Assessment Program 
(Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency, 02/09) 
 
 Regulation 
(banks and 
depository 
institutions) 
 
Structural regulatory 
reform 
(‘Glass-Steagall lite’ 
and separation of retail 
from ‘casino banking’) 
 
‘Volcker rule’ (President’s Economic 
Recovery Advisory Board (01/10), Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, 07/10); and ‘Vickers’ ring-
fence’ (Independent Commission on Banking, 
09/11, Banking Reform Act, 12/13). 
 
 Debt 
(sovereign debt) 
Fiscal deficit 
reductions  
(‘austerity’) 
‘Emergency budget’ (HM Treasury, 06/10); 
2011 Budget and National Commission on 
Fiscal Responsibility and Reform (02/10); and 
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Budget Control Act (08/11). 
 
 
 
To underline the contribution of the book in another way, it does not seek to be an exhaustive 
empirical survey of financial crisis management, as enacted in its Anglo-American heartland 
between 2007 and 2011. Not only would this arguably be beyond the scope of any single 
book, it is also not my motivation here. Neither does the book offer technical assessments of 
the success, or otherwise, of this or that intervention in achieving a resolution to the crisis. 
This is not a book that is concerned with making an academic contribution to lesson learning 
about how future crises might be managed more effectively (cf. Davies and Green 2010; 
Goodhart 2009; Griffith-Jones, Ocampo and Stiglitz 2010; Turner, Haldane and Wooley 
2010; Wolf 2008). Instead, as it works towards a cultural economy account of how the crisis 
was governed as a series of problems, the book develops a line of inquiry set out by Peter 
Miller and Nikolas Rose (1990) in their agenda for the study of ‘governing economic life’. As 
they understand it, given the tendencies for the liberal governing of economic life to be 
‘eternally optimistic’ and ‘a congenitally failing operation’, ‘The “will to govern” needs to be 
understood less in terms of its success than in terms of the difficulties of operationalizing it’ 
(pp. 10-11). Thus, and as Chapter 9 underscores by way of conclusion, what is of interest 
here is how crisis governance emerged as an achievement in and of itself, and not whether it 
can be said to have functioned successfully or to have achieved its stated ends.        
 
What the book will show is that the governance of the global financial crisis was enacted with 
great difficulty through relatively distinct, problem-orientated apparatuses of governance. As 
provisional and multiple attempts to prevent the unravelling of global finance, these 
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apparatuses were strategic but distributed and relational forms of agency. They clearly 
featured sovereign state institutions, but were certainly not reducible to them. As they framed 
and acted upon the crisis, each governance apparatus mobilized and assembled a number of 
specific elements in relation. Chapters 3 to 8 will draw out these specificities: what did it 
take, for example, for an apparatus to come together which rendered the crisis governable as 
a technical problem of liquidity? Across these chapters, moreover, the book will also argue 
that the discrete apparatuses of crisis governance had certain tendencies which they shared to 
a greater or lesser degree. That which the consensus on sovereign states salvaging markets 
conceals is, therefore, not merely the contingent and fragmented ways in which the crisis was 
governed as a series of problems. It also obscures the very character and content of crisis 
governance; that is, the proclivities that were typically present as each apparatus of 
governance was assembled, and the ordering preferences that were largely common across 
them.  
 
As state institutions were mobilized in crisis governance apparatuses, what was especially 
notable was how sovereign monetary, fiscal, and regulatory techniques were reconfigured. 
The prevailing perception of crisis management imagines dormant sovereign powers -- ‘sent 
to the oblivion of history by the apologists of market fundamentalism’ prior to the crisis, 
according to Castells, Caraça, and Cardosa (2012: 3) – being wielded on an unprecedented 
scale by state institutions. The crisis thus appears to usher in a ‘return of the state’ (Eppler 
2009; Grewal 2010; Plender 2008), and to produce a welcome shift in the ‘balance’ between 
state and market, or public and private authority, in favour of the former (e.g. Germain 2012). 
As the then President of France, Nicolas Sarkozy, put it in a speech made at the height of the 
crisis in September 2008, ‘Self-regulation is finished. Laissez faire is finished. The all-
powerful market that is always right is finished’ (in Thornhill 2008). What this dichotomous 
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thinking obscures, however, is not only the ‘permanent activity, vigilance and intervention’ 
of the state during the preceding boom years (Foucault 2008: 246), but how sovereign 
monetary, fiscal, and regulatory techniques were dynamically transformed in order that they 
could be put to work in the governance of the bust.  
 
The apparatuses of crisis management also did not stand apart from and govern over the 
economy of markets and banks, but actually enrolled the discourses and devices of economy. 
The crisis was certainly a moment of disaster for economic science as a discipline that, over 
the last forty years in particular, perfected theories that made powerful explanatory claims 
about the financial markets (e.g. Economist 2009b; Fine and Milonakis 2011). But, the same 
cannot be said for economics that, in its original and ancient formulation of oikonomia, is a 
practical and managerial disposition for administering order (Agamben 2011; Mitchell 2008). 
The knowledges, terms, and techniques of economics were immanent to the administration of 
the crisis. This is not to argue, however, that crisis governance should be understood simply 
as the imposition of a consistent economic theory, ideology, and political programme. It is in 
these instrumental terms that, following a roughly twelve-month period of ‘Keynesian 
schadenfreude’ at the peak of the tumult (Elliott 2009; Stiglitz 2008a), the persistence of neo-
liberal economic policies tends to be explained by much critical academic commentary on the 
crisis (e.g. Crouch 2011; Gamble 2009; Hall 2011; Harvey 2010; Mirowski 2013, Peck 
2013a). Crisis management was broadly neo-liberal in orientation, to be sure: when 
extensively mustering sovereign techniques, it held firm ordering preferences not only for the 
market exchange of classical liberalism, but for the competitive and entrepreneurial market 
society of neo-liberalism (Foucault 2008: 145-7). But, crisis governance revealed more about 
the power of economics as a means of administration than it did about the grip of neo-
liberalism as a coherent body of economic thought. The specific economic discourses that 
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were activated, as governmental apparatuses both framed problems and proffered solutions, 
were multiple, fragmented, and, at times, contradictory. And, significantly, crisis 
management also mobilized a diverse array of calculative devices of economy that were 
already at large within the financial markets when crisis came, not least because they 
provided quantitative, material indicators of the extent and nature of the problems at hand. 
 
While the management of the crisis was replete with all manner of measures and metrics, 
what also characterized the relatively discrete governance apparatuses was that they sought to 
elicit an affective atmosphere of confidence. The contemporary crisis certainly gave impetus 
to academic explanations that seek to bring emotions and collective affective energies to front 
and centre in the study of financial markets, typically as a corrective to orthodox economic 
assumptions about the rationality of market agents. For instance, behavioural economics, 
which stressed tendencies to ‘irrational exuberance’ in the ‘new economy’ stock market 
bubble at the turn of the millennium (Shiller 2001), again had ample grist for its mill when 
the crisis hit (Heukelom and Sent 2010; Shiller 2008). Longer standing Keynesian insights 
into the ‘animal spirits’ that move markets were also given a new lease of life and scientific 
sheen when combined with the psychological methods of behaviouralism (Akerlof and 
Shiller 2009). The crisis also rejuvenated the interests of sociologists in market emotions 
(Berezin 2009; Pixley 2012; Swedberg 2012). And, calls have been made for SSF to address 
the field’s neglect of the affective forces that, in conjunction with the calculations of market 
devices, make market action possible (Callon 2012; Zaloom 2008). What this book will 
show, however, is that such calls for the study of financial markets to pay greater attention to 
emotional and/or affective dynamics largely miss the point: inciting an atmosphere of 
confidence in order to reanimate finance was a crucial concern in crisis governance. Without 
drawing on a clear body of economic thought to specify what ‘confidence’ is, or why 
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conditions of confidence are crucial for financial flows, governance apparatuses often 
attempted to work on and through its generative energies.   
 
Moreover, apparatuses did not govern the crisis as a dislocation of market, banking, or 
financial capital circulations per se, but as posing a fundamental threat to the financialized 
security of the population in which those uncertain circulations are deeply implicated. The 
governance of the crisis as a security dilemma in Anglo-America was a matter of restarting, 
and keeping in motion, the vital and turbulent flows of global finance because of the 
opportunities that they apparently afford for the wealth and wellbeing of society. Crisis 
governance operated, in short, at the interstices of ‘finance/security’ (de Goede 2010, 2012; 
also Aitken 2007; Amoore 2011; Boy, Burgess, and Leander 2011; Lobo-Guerrero 2011; 
Martin 2007). What was to be secured was not merely the markets, the banks, and the 
financing of the productive economy that they are said to provide for, but the continuation of 
three decades or so of popular stock market investment and privatized pensions, on the one 
hand, and the expanded and widespread availability of mortgage loans and consumer credit, 
on the other (Langley 2008b). The governance of the crisis was, in short, a range of ordering 
interventions that attempted to ensure the persistence of the global circulations of a particular, 
valued form of Anglo-American, neo-liberal life. 
 
Although the legacies of crisis management continue to play out, it is clear at present that 
new means of modulating the intensities of global financial circulations and of preparing for 
the eventualities of the next financial crisis did emerge from the apparatuses of crisis 
governance. Viewed in the round, the heat of crisis management did not produce a consistent 
vision of emboldened state institutions ruling out or reigning in the uncertain circulations of 
global finance, or an associated return to precautionary techniques for addressing the future 
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threats of another financial crisis. There has been no coherent or explicit attempt to crisis-
proof finance. Instead, and alongside the consolidation of certain supposed crisis-relieving 
actions into longer-term agendas for monetary and fiscal policymaking (i.e. quantitative 
easing, austerity), crisis governance heralded change in the mechanisms designed to 
‘modulate’ (Deleuze 1992) and to ‘mitigate’ (Collier 2008) the destructive forces of uncertain 
global financial circulations. Previously nascent or marginal techniques were brought to the 
fore and became mainstream in global finance, broadly paralleling developments witnessed 
across a range of other domains over the course of the last decade or so (Amoore 2013; 
Anderson 2010; Walters 2006). As Chapters 5, 6, and 7 will show, rendering the crisis 
governable as problems of solvency, risk, and regulation provided, in particular, a significant 
spur to the development of techniques that govern through, as opposed to against, 
uncertainty. These are the techniques which have been corralled into governmental 
programmes designed to advance the ‘resilience’ of banks and banking systems, and to offer 
a ‘macro-prudential’ approach to financial stability and regulation. To date, and in sum, the 
bequest of crisis governance has been a will to put in place new technical fixes capable of 
reconciling the vicissitudes of global financial circulations with the prospects that they 
seemingly hold for wealth creation and popular security.       
